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Recent Decisions
CRIMINAL LAW- EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURES
The defendant, charged with selling opium in violation of the
Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 173, 174 (1909), and
conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371 (1948), was at large on
bail. During a conversation in his laundry and dwelling with an
old acquaintance, Chin Poy, petitioner made self-incriminating
statements. Unknown to the defendant, Chin Poy was equipped
with a microphone over which the conversation was heard by a
Federal Narcotics agent outside the laundry. Petitioner objected
to the admission of the agent's testimony, asserting that the
manner in which it was obtained violated both the search and
seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. §605 (1934), and offended against the judicial policy
requiring fair play in federal law enforcement. (Cf. McNabb v.
United States, 318 U. S. 332 [1943]). The evidence was admitted,
forming the basis for his conviction, from which an appeal was
taken.
The Court of Appeals, 193 F. 2d 306 (2d Cir. 1952), in an
opinion by Chief Judge Swan, held the evidence admissible as
against a "wiretapping" objection since there was no "intercep-
tion" within the meaning of the Comunications Act. Distinguish-
ing between cases involving the seizure of tangible and intangible
evidence, the majority found no trespass to any area constitu-
tionally protected by the search and seizure provision of the
Fourth Amendment. Judge Jerome Frank dissented, arguing that
the concealment of the microphone constituted a trespass, and
thus an "unreasonable search" making the evidence obtained by
the federal agent inadmissible under the exclusionary rule of
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirnied
the judgment, Mr. Justice Jackson writing for the majority. The
court held that the conduct in obtaining the evidence was not an
unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, was not in violation of the Federal Communications
Act, and was not inconsistent with the "civilized standards" policy
in federal law enforcement. Mr. Justice Black dissented, differ-
ing with the majority on the latter ground. Mr. Justice Douglas,
completely reversing his position taken in Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1941), dissented on the ground that any
invasion of the privacy of a constitutionally protected area, such
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as an office or dwelling place, aided by a scientific device though
not accompanied by a physical intrusion is an unreasonable search
and seizure. Under this view, spying through a keyhole or listen-
ing against a wall with the naked ear, without proof of a prior
trespass, would be reasonable. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, also in
dissent, said that the police should not be allowed to employ
under-handed tactics in gathering evidence and indicated that
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which held "wire-
tapping" to be a "reasonable search" should be overruled, quot-
ing from Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent therein, that it is "a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government
should play an ignoble part." Mr. Justice Burton, with the con-
currence of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissented saying that the
presence of the radio transmitter amounted to a surreptitious
entry of the agent stationed outside and thus an unreasonable
search and seizure. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
The Fourth Amendment problems arising during the first cen-
tury of our nation primarily involved the search for and seizure
of tangible things. The prohibition was held to cover letters in
the mail, Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877); books, papers,
and documents taken from an office, Silverthorne v. United States,
251 U. S. 385 (1920); and papers and articles in the home, Weeks
v. United States, supra. It was early announced that the interpreta-
tion to be accorded the Fourth Amendment was to be liberal "to
effectuate the great purposes of the guarantee." Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886). When, similar to the informer in the
principal case, a government agent gained entry by posing a friend-
ly call, his surreptitious taking of books and papers was held to be
an unlawful search and seizure. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S.
298 (1920). Although the latter case has been said to be the outer
limit of the protection, the Olmstead case, supra, it appears that
the privacy of a dwelling, office, or other inclosure is well protected
from searches and seizures for tangible evidence.
With scientific and technological advances in crime detection
devices, it has become possible to intercept communications and
overhear far distant conversations. An early and leading case in-
volving the problem of modern devices and the Fourth Amendment
was the Olmstead case, supra, where Mr. Chief Justice Taft for the
Supreme Court said that gaining evidence by intercepting telephone
messages from or to defendant's premises was not an unlawful
search, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment protected only "tan-
gible material effects." Thus any physical invasion of privacy to
overhear confidentially spoken words or gather other intangible
evidence would apparently be held reasonable. However, later
Court of Appeals decisions found a Fourth Amendment violation
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where policemen made a physical entry without the express or im-
plied consent of the defendant and without a proper search warrant
or authority to arrest, and obtained evidence intangible in nature,
such as incriminating admissions. Nueslein v. District of Columbia,
73 App. D. C. 85, 115 F. 2d 690 (1940); Fraternal Order of Eagles
v. United States, 57 F. 2d 93 (3rd Cir. 1932). In the Goldman case,
supra, the Supreme Court, following the Olmstead case, supra, held
no illegal search and seizure to exist where federal police officers
listened to conversations within an office by means of a detecta-
phone placed on the outside of a wall, but added a limitation by
dictum that an entry to install a dictaphone "might be said to"
render evidence obtained thereby inadmissible. The effect of the
latter cases in limiting the Olmstead case, supra, seems to be that
a traditional trespass to a constitutionally protected area makes in-
tangible evidence gained thereby inadmissible.
Although it has been indicated that a "place of business" is
not to receive the constitutional protection of a private home, Davis
v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 588 (1946), both the lower court
and Supreme Court in the principal case assumed the laundry and
dwelling of the defendant to have the sanctity accorded homes
and offices in the previous cases. Weeks v. United States, supra;
Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1920); Silverthorne v. United
States, supra. Thus if a trespass either by the informer or the
eavesdropping agent could be found, the evidence according to the
purport of the above cases would seem to have been unreasonably
obtained. That the court in the principal case was influenced by
the Olmstead case dichotomy between tangibles and intangibles is
indicated by their refusal in this area of "intangible" searches to
hold the informer who brought the microphone onto the premises
a trespasser, although a similar entry was held unlawful in the
seizure of books and papers. Gouled v. United States, supra. Fur-
ther, the presence of the microphone without consent was held not
to be a trespass, the court requiring at least an unpermitted physical
entry by the officer, as in the Nueslein case, supra. But in the area
of tangible evidence, it is plausible that the surreptitious presence
of a mechanical arm reaching through a window to snatch a paper
from a desk top would be held unlawful.
The distinction between tangible and intangible evidence seems
unrealistic in the modern age. No longer is the policeman limited
to overhearing spoken words with the naked ear; science has en-
abled him to go far beyond that. The intent of the Fourth Amend-
ment to secure the people's private matters against unreasonable
inspections and discoveries should not be defeated by a narrow
construction of its language to pefmit law enforcement officers to
do all but enter homes and seize papers. The spirit of the amend-
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ment should control, an interpretation which is also in line with
the judicial policy announced by the McNabb case, supra. It is
hoped that such a construction of the amendment will soon be
adopted by the court and that the use of scientific devices to dis-
cover events and overhear conversations occurring within a dwell-
ing will be held unreasonable without an order of search.
Robert E. McGinnis
LXAN.DLORD AND TENANr - PROPERTY LEASED FOR
AmTSEMENT PURPOSES - LABLnT OF LESSOR
The plaintiff, who was attending a professional football game,
was injured by the collapse of temporary bleachers in a park
owned by the defendant but leased to the Cleveland Rams. The
defendant employed police, ticket takers, and ushers who were
being used by the lessee when the injury occurred. The Supreme
Court held that the trial court had not erred in holding as a mat-
ter of law that the plaintiff could recover from the defendant. In
re Brown v. Cleveland Baseball Co., 158 Ohio St. 1, 106 N.E. 2d
632 (1952).
At common law the landlord owed no duty to repair the
leased premises unless he contracted to do so. The tenant took
the property for better or worse and the landlord was not liable
to the lessee for not repairing. The landlord was not bound to re-
pair if the defect was existing at the time of the lease. Divines v.
Dickinson, 189 Iowa 194, 174 N.W. 8 (1919). He was not bound
to repair if the defect occurred after the lease was entered into.
Russell v. Little, 22 Idaho 429, 126 Pac. 529 (1912). This is the
general rule concerning the liability as to repairs of the lessor to
the lessee. TnrEAxY, REmn. PROPERTY §103 (1939).
It seems logical to extend this doctrine of non-liability of the
landlord to business patrons of the tenant who suffer injuries. The
law should regard this invitee as standing in the shoes of the
tenant and the same rules applying to the tenant should apply
to the business patron. Dalton v. Gilson, 192 Mass. 1, 77 N.E. 1035
(1906); Bloecher v. Duerbeck, 333 Mo. 359, 62 S.W. 2d 553 (1933).
But, most courts would say that if the property is leased for
public or semi-public purposes, the owner is responsible. Colorado
Mortgage and Investment Co. v. Galcomini, 55 Colo. 540, 136 Pac.
1039 (1913) (Hotel); Campbell v. Elsie S. Holding Co., 251 N.Y.
446, 167 N.E. 582 (1929) (Warehouse). These courts say the the
lessor cannot evade liability to a third person for damages result-
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ing from a dangerous condition on the property that was leased for
such public purposes. They say the lessor has a duty to make the
property safe for the purposes intended. Their reasoning is that
the lessor should not be receiving rent for such uses where he
has not exercised due care in repairing and maintaining the
premises. The public, who do not have the opportunity to inspect
the property, are deemed to be invited by the owner. Thus, most
courts have made an exception to the rule of non-liability of the
lessor in the case where the premises are leased for public pur-
poses. Van Avery v. Platt Valley Land and Investment Co., 133
Neb. 314, 275 N.W. 288 (1937) (Public garage); Martin v. Asbury
Park, 111 N.J.L. 364, 168 Atl. 612 (1933) (Public bathing pavilion)
123 A.L.R. 870 (1939).
There are some courts which deny the applicability of this
exception to other than amusement places. They reason that the
property is not intended for public use when the property is
leased for ordinary business purposes. Clark v. Chase Hotel Co.,
230 Mo. App. 739, 74 S.W. 2d 498 (1934); Hayden v. Second Nat.
Bank of Allentown, 331 Pa. 29, 199 Atl. 218 (1938).
But there is a growing tendency toward expanding the appli-
cation of this principal of responsibility of the lessor to business
invitees. CownmNr, 50 -LuAv. L.R. 725, 743 (1937); Note, 62 Hnv.
L.R. 669 (1949). Most of the courts which recognize this excep-
tion do go farther and hold that the lessor is liable even where
the premises are rented for a business concern such as stores,
hotels, garages, professional offices as well as amusement places.
These courts say that if the lessor knew the lessee was going to
admit large numbers of people on the property, it put these in-
vitees at an unreasonable risk. Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn.
515, 7 A. 2d 515 (1939) (Beauty shop); McCarthy v. Maxon, 134
Conn. 170, 55 A. 2d 912 (1947) (Veterinarian's office); Turner v.
Kent, 134 Kan. 574, 7 P. 2d 513 (1932) (Grocery store).
Therefore, generally throughout the country, places of amuse-
ment are not considered the same as other premises where a per-
son enters the property as the invitee of the tenant. Amusement
places are considered an exception to the general rule of caveat
emptor with respect to the lessor's liability. Junkerman v. Tilyou
Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915); 123 A.L.R. 872
(1939). This exception recognizes a duty of the lessor to the public
of exercising ordinary care to provide against defects in construc-
tion, defects caused by the property being in a state of disrepair
at the time of the lease, or a condition which, because of the
nature of the thing, will eventually result in the property being
dangerous when put to the use intended. Tulsa Entertainment Co.
v. Greenlees, 85 Okla. 113, 205 Pac. 179 (1922); Beaman v. Grooms,
138 Tenn. 320, 197 S.W. 1090 (1917).
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A Pennsylvania case with facts similar to the instant case
held the lessor liable to patrons for injuries sustained in the fall
of a leased grandstand containing defective timber when the
lessor could have discovered the defect. Folkman v. Lauer and
Kane v. Lauer, 244 Pa. 605, 91 Atl. 218 (1914). The Pennsylvania
court followed the majority rule in holding the lessor was liable for
injuries suffered by a third person because of defects in the prem-
ises at the time the lease was made which were known by him or
could have been known by him with the exercise of due care. 4
THoNasoN ON REAL PROPERTY §1555. These courts conclude that
the lessor should have expected that the lessee would admit his
patrons before the land was put in reasonably safe condition for
their reception. The two reasons for this conclusion are that the
lease was for so short a period as to make it unreasonable to ex-
pect that the lessee will make any change while using the land,
and that it may be leased for a use so immediate that the lessee
has no opportunity to make the repairs or alterations necessary
to make the land safe for visitors. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §359
(1934).
In Ohio, as in the majority of states, the courts have followed
the common law proposition that the lessor is not liable for the
defective condition of the property to the lessee or to third parties
who come there by right of the lessee; but Ohio has not followed
the exception to this rule concerning amusement places. Marqua
v. Martin, 109 Ohio St. 56, 141 N.E. 654 (1923); 24 0. Ju. 951.
Ohio courts say that a landlord who has demised property, part-
ing with possession and control thereof to a tenant in occupation
is not responsible for injuries arising from the defective condition
of such premises. Their reasoning is that persons who claim dam-
ages because they were invited into a dangerous place in which
they received injuries must seek their remedy against the person
who invited them. Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393 (1875);
Stackhouse v. Close, 83 Ohio St. 339, 94 N.E. 746 (1911).
Since Ohio courts do not recognize this exception, the injured
party must show that the landlord was in possession and control
of a part of the demised premises. If this is shown then the land-
lord is liable for damage caused by his negligence. Devou v.
Hughes, 89 Ohio St. 453, 106 N.E. 1053, (1914); Medley v. Seiter,
39 Ohio App. 570, 178 N.E. 37 (1931).
In the instant case we see the Ohio court following this prac-
tice. They say that one having neither occupation nor control of
premises ordinarily has no legal duty to an invitee of another with
respect to the condition or use of these premises. Then to show this
occupation or control, they say that the lessor had the power and
right to admit such individuals to the premises or exclude them.
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Thus having established that the lessor had not substantially re-
linquished to his lessee all occupation and control over a portion
of the leased premises and has actually exercised his right of oc-
cupation and control over such portion, the lessor is under the
duty to exercise ordinary care with respect to the condition of
such portion and that duty extends to an invitee of the lessee.
To determine whether occupation and control was retained by
the lessor, the Ohio court has held in other cases that if the lessor
has agreed to make repairs, his right to enter upon the premises
and make those repairs does not amount to retaining such occu-
pation and control of the premises as to subject him to liability
if he failed or neglected to make repairs. Ripple v. Mahoning
National Bank, 143 Ohio St. 614, 56 N.E. 2d 289 (1944); Cooper v.
Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E. 2d 545 (1949).In the Cooper case, supra, the owner had made an agreement to
make repairs. The court there held that liability of the landlord
can be based only on occupation and control, and that the land-
lord's agreement to repair did not reserve to him this power and
right to admit and exclude people from the porch where the
plaintiff was injured. The court in the instant case says that the
Cooper case indicates that the unexercised power and right of a
lessor to occupation and control of premises may not be incon-
sistent with such lessor's complete relinquishment of occupation
and control of the premises. But to get their result the court says
that the instant case does not involve the mere existence of a right
and power to occupy and control premises. Instead they say it in-
volves a substantial exercise of that right and power.
Thus the court arrived at the right result in the principle case,
but felt compelled to reach it through a tortuous process of rea-
soning. Better reasoning which the other states follow is to hold
the lessor liable when the public is invited upon the property and
the lessee is to be in possession a relatively short time. It is always
better to meet the problem squarely than to try to reach a result
by a fictitious method. This case presented an opportunity to de-
velop in Ohio the beneficial doctrine which is generally accepted
elsewhere.
Carl E. Juergens
TORTS - GUEST STATUTE - WHO Is GUEST
From the allegations of the petition and opening statement
of counsel it appeared that plaintiff, a twelve year old boy scout,
and defendant, his assistant scout master, were engaged in collect-
ing waste paper from premises along the public streets and trans-
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porting it to a central point as an enterprise for the benefit of the
scout troop. Plaintiff was assisting in the project by collecting,
placing, and securing the paper on a trailer attached to defend-
ant's automobile, during which process he mounted and dis-
mounted from the trailer and received transportation thereon. In
attempting to regain his position on the trailer, the plaintiff was
injured through defendant's negligent operation of the automo-
bile and trailer. Defendant's motion for judgment on the petition
and opening statement of counsel was denied. On appeal by de-
fendant, held, affirmed. The pleadings and opening statement of
counsel allege facts which disclose the plaintiff to be other than
a guest within the meaning of the guest statute and therefor the
allegation of negligence raises an issue for the jury. Vest v. Kramer,
158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N. E. 2d 105 (1952).
The Ohio guest statute became effective June 15, 1933. Omo
GEN. CODE Sec. 6303-6. Prior to that time the operator of a motor
vehicle owed a duty of reasonable care to an invited guest. Sparrow
v. Levine, 19 Ohio App. 94 (1923); Mester v. Unkefer, 24 Ohio
App. 420, 157 N. E. 714 (1927). The guest statute completely
abrogates liability to a guest except for wilful and wanton mis-
conduct. Cunningham v. Bell, 149 Ohio St. 103, 77 N. E. 2d 918
(1948); O'Rourke v. Gunsley, 154 Ohio St. 375, 96 N. E. 2d 1
(1950). The question then is, who is a guest within the meaning
of the statute?
Most American courts have adopted the designations "pas-
senger" and "guest" for determining this question, defining a
guest as one carried gratuitously, riding for his own pleasure upon
invitation of the driver, and passenger as one who is transported
for compensation or reward. Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237,
143 P. 2d 704 (1943); Miller v. Miller, 395 Ill. 273, 69 N. E. 2d 878
(1946); Shields v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 Atl. 323 (1934);
RESTATEmENT, ToRTs, sec 490. It is generally held that compensa-
tion or benefit to the driver need not be money, but any substan-
tial benefit or recompense to the driver making it worthwhile to
furnish the ride is enough to make the rider a passenger and not
a guest. George v. Stanfield, 33 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Idaho 1940);
Shields v. Audette, supra; 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, sec. 399; 5
Am. JuR., AUTomoBmEs, sec. 239.
In Ohio it was decided that since the guest statute was in
derogation of the common law it must be strictly construed;
therefore, if the rider falls in any category other than guest, the
driver is not relieved of liability for negligence. Miller v. Fairly,
141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N. E. 2d 217 (1943); Kitchens v. Dullefied,
149 Ohio St. 500, N. E. 2d 906 (1948). According to the guest
statute, a person making payment for his transportation is not a
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guest and the problem arises in the interpretation of the word
payment. If payment for the transportation is agreed upon, the
rider in the automobile is of course a passenger and not a guest.
Dougherty Adm'r. v. Hal, 70 Ohio App. 163, 45 N. E. 2d 608
(1941). But what, other than this agreed upon payment, will take
the driver out of the protection of the statute?
In Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N. E. 2d 140
(1942), the Ohio Supreme Court declared that it is not neces-
sary that payment be made in money to constitute an individual
transported a passenger and not a guest. It was pointed out that
payment for transportation may be made in numerous ways, such
as, "when the host has a financial or business interest in the time
or service of the passenger and the purpose of the transportation
is to take the passenger to or from his place of employment";
"when a substantial or tangible benefit is conferred upon the
host"; or "when the compensation is paid by a third person." In
Dern v. Village of North Olmstead, 133 Ohio St. 375, 14 N. E. 2d
11 (1938), a guest was defined as one who is invited, either di-
rectly or by implication, to enjoy the hospitality of the driver of
a motor vehicle, who accepts such hospitality and rides for his
own pleasure or business without making any return to, or con-
ferring any benefit upon, the driver, other than the mere pleasure
of his company.
In line with the prevailing test of American courts, the Ohio
Supreme Court in the case of Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St.
50, 87 N. E. 2d 87 (1949), distinguished between passenger and
guest and held that if the transportation confers a benefit only on
the rider, and no benefit, other than such as are incidental to
hospitality, good will, or the like, on the person furnishing the
transportation, the rider is a guest; but if his carriage tends to
promote the mutual interests of both himself and the driver for
their common benefit, thus creating a business relationship, or
where the rider accompanies the driver at the instance of the
latter for the purpose of having the rider render a benefit or
service to the driver, the rider is a passenger and not a guest.
From these definitions and distinctions it would seem to follow
that in the principal case plaintiff was not a guest. The court de-
cided that either plaintiff was rendering a service to defendant,
or it was an enterprise of mutual interest for their common bene-
fit, either of which would render plaintiff a passenger and thus not
a guest within the meaning of the Ohio guest statute.
Milton Bartholomew
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TRADE REGULATION - CoNsTITUTIONALITY OF THE
LOUISIANA FAIR TRADE ACT
Plaintiff, a manufacturer of drug products, brought a bill to
restrain defendants, operators of two supermarkets in the city of
New Orleans, from selling its products below the minimum price
fixed by contracts between plaintiff and other retailers pursuant
to the Louisiana Fair Trade Act. LSA-R. S. 51:392-51:394. The act
provides that signers or non-signers of the contracts shall not sell
below the contract price fixed by the producer of a commodity
bearing a trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer thereof.
Defendants, admitting sales in violation of the act, challenge its
constitutionality as well as the constitutionality of the McGuire
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1952), which exempts state fair trade acts
from the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1
(1890). The United States District Court held that the above leg-
islation does not violate the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as the
price-fixing is reasonably related to the valid objective of protect-
ing the producer's property right in the brand name and good will
of the product. Eli, Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Grant Super-
markets, 109 F. Supp. 269 (E. D. La. 1953).
The Supreme Court of the United States held that resale price
maintenance contracts were invalid as an unreasonable restraint of
trade both under the common law and under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, but indicated that such contracts would be valid under
appropriate legislation. Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D.
Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Boston Store of Chicago v.
American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8 (1918). From 1914 until
1932, thirty bills were introduced into Congress to legalize resale
price contracts in interstate commerce, but none was passed. SELG-
AND LovE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 479 (1932).
From 1931 until 1936, fourteen state fair trade acts, similar to the
act involved in the principal case, were passed, and twenty-eight
more were enacted in 1937; today, all states have the acts except
Texas, Vermont, and Missouri. For a table of acts, see 3 CALLAN,
UNFARu COMPETITION AmD TRADE-MARKs 1764 (1945). The alleged
purpose of these acts is to protect retailers from being under-sold
by large chain stores. See Note, 49 YALE L. J. 145 (1939). In 1937,
Congressional support was given to the policy behind these acts
by the passage of the Miller-Tydings Act exempting resale price
contracts under state fair trade acts from the scope of the Sherman
and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. 1-7
(1940), amending 26 STAT. 209 (1890) and 49 STAT. 1526 (1936).
When the immunity of the Miller-Tydings Act was interpreted to
exclude enforcement of the fair trade acts as against non-signers,
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Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384
(1951), Congress immediately passed the McGuire Act to bind non-
signers.
Frequently, the fair trade acts have been attacked as fixing
prices in violation of the federal and state constitutions. In 1936,
the New York Fair Trade Act was held to violate the due process
clause of the state constitution as fixing prices of commodities not
affected with the public interest. Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. R.
H. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936). However,
later in 1936, the Supreme Court of the United States in an unani-
mous decision upheld the constitutionality of the flinois Fair Trade
Act as being an "appropriate means" of protecting the property of
the producer in the good will and brand name of the commodity
otherwise owned by the non-signing retailer. Old Dearborn Distill-
ing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); for a
collection of cases prior to the Old Dearborn case, supra, see 7
A.L.R. 449 (1920), 19 A.L.R. 926 (1922), and 32 A.L.R. 1087 (1924).
The unsettled position of small business during the thirties seemed
to be implicitly determinative of the holding in the Old Dearborn
case. In view of the Old Dearborn case, supra, the New York court
felt duty bound to overrule the Doubleday case, supra, although it
had been decided on state constitutional grounds. Bourjois Sale
Corp., v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167 7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937). During the
ensuing years, the acts were repeatedly held constitutional by
various state courts. For a collection of cases, see 19 A.L.R. 2d
1139 (1951). These courts repeatedly bolstered the acts by relying
on the good will theory, although the more direct but unsupportable
objective was to protect independent retailers from vigorous chain
store price competition.
Recently, the judicial trend has been to adopt a more critical
attitude toward the fair trade acts. In 1949, the Florida Supreme
Court, recognizing the anti-competitive feature of their fair trade
act, held it unconstitutional as an invalid use of the police power
for a private, not a public purpose. Liquor Store, Inc., v. Contin-
ental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (1949). In 1950, two state fair
trade acts were held to be constitutional although both courts noted
the Florida decision. W. A. Scheaffer Pen Co. v. Barrett, 209 Miss.
1, 45 So. 2d 838 (1950); Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberato, 190
Tenn. 478, 230 S.W. 2d 971 (1950). Later, the Michigan Supreme
Court held their act unconstitutional, expressly approving the Liq-
uor Store case, supra, and recognizing the act as fixing prices of
goods not "affected with public interest." Shakespeare Company v.
Lippmann's Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W. 2d 268
(1952). In holding their fair trade act unconstitutional on other
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grounds, the Georgia Supreme Court, as an additional reason for
its decision, indicated that the act violated the due process clause
of the state constitution by fixing prices of commodities not affected
with the public interest. Grayson Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida,
Lts., CCH TRDE CASEs 67442 (1953).
Because the fair trade acts have resulted in the economic evil
of forcing manufacturers to set higher prices, the Federal Trade
Commission recommended the repeal of the Miler-Tydings Act.
Federal Trade Commission Report on Price Maintenance LXI,
LXrV (1945); see also Final Report and Recommendations of the
T.N.E.C., SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 121, (1941). A
lower federal court has said by dictum that the Supreme Court of
the United States today might hold the fair trade acts unconstitu-
tional as the economic conditions that prompted the decision in
the Old Dearborn case, supra, in 1936, no longer obtain. Sunbeam
Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F. 2d 903 (3rd Cir. 1950); rev'd on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 944 (1951). If good will were the controlling fac-
tor, and not economic considerations, a change in economic views
should not affect the result. But the dicta of these decisions seem
to indicate that such is not the case. The principal case indicated
that the Supreme Court of the United States, if faced with the ques-
tion today, might reverse itself and decide that the real objective
of the act was price-fixing and not protecting the good will of the
producer, but hesitated to override the Old Dearborn case, supra.
The hope is expressed that the present trend towards holding the
fair trade acts unconstitutional will continue since the inflexible
price arrangements which they sanction are not in line with the
traditional concepts of free competition.
Robert E. McGinnis
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